JOURNAL OF GLOBAL SPORT MANAGEMENT
https://doi.org/10.1080/24704067.2019.1669067

Intercollegiate Athletics: A Unique Segment of the Sport Industry

Barbara Osborne, Jonathan A. Jensen and Erianne A. Weight

Sports Administration, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, USA

ABSTRACT
Intercollegiate athletics in the United States is a unique educational opportunity for participants, a passion-inducing bond for the student body, and a branding and development vehicle for the university. The purpose of this paper is to introduce this unique segment of the sport industry to those who may not be familiar with the US-based system of intercollegiate athletics. A very brief history of the evolution of intercollegiate athletics in the United States, an overview of the governance structure, and a description of some unique challenges and benefits of college athletics are provided.

校际体育:体育产业中一个独特的部分

美国校际运动对参与者来说是一个独特的教育机会。对学生群体来说, 它既是一种激发激情的纽带；对大学来说, 也是一种品牌和发展的载体。本文旨在向那些不熟悉美国的人介绍以校际运动为基础的体育产业系统。本文也将简要介绍美国校际运动的发展历史, 概述大学校际运动的治理结构, 以及大学校际体育运动的一些独特挑战和好处。

ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 8 July 2019
Accepted 9 July 2019

KEYWORDS
intercollegiate athletics; college sport; sport governance; sport branding

关键词
校际运动; 高校体育; 体育管理; 体育品牌

1. Introduction

Intercollegiate athletics in the United States is a unique educational opportunity for participants, a passion-inducing bond for the student body, and a branding and development vehicle for the university. The purpose of this paper is to introduce this unique segment of the sport industry to those who may not be familiar with the US-based system of intercollegiate athletics. A very brief history of the evolution of intercollegiate athletics in the United States, an overview of the governance structure, and a description of some unique challenges and benefits of college athletics are provided.

2. History of College Athletics

College athletics evolved organically as students at private colleges and universities in the northeastern United States created athletic teams and chose to compete against

CONTACT Erianne A. Weight eweight@unc.edu Sports Administration, University of North Carolina, 203A Woollen Gym, CB# 8605, Chapel Hill, NC, USA

teams from other schools. Well before the two most popular collegiate sports – football and basketball – were even invented, rowing teams were established at Harvard University and Yale University in the 1940s. On August 3, 1852, Harvard and Yale competed in the first recognized intercollegiate athletics contest, a regatta. The competition between the two institutions remains the oldest collegiate athletics rivalry. Throughout the 1850s, baseball clubs were being formed, with Amherst College competing against Williams College in the first intercollegiate baseball game in 1859. A decade later, the first intercollegiate football game was played between Rutgers and Princeton (then called the College of New Jersey) in 1869. Students continued to drive intercollegiate athletics programs through the 1870 s, establishing sport associations for rowing in 1871, football in 1876, and baseball in 1879 (Smith, 2011).

As intercollegiate athletics became more popular, faculty at colleges and universities grew more concerned about the role of athletics within the academy. Teams were comprised not only of traditional students, but also graduate students, alumni, part-time students, and some professionals who were not enrolled at all. Academic integrity, the reputation of the institution, and the proper balance between academics and athletics on campus were all concerns. Faculty at Princeton University were so concerned they formed the Committee on Athletics and Music in 1881 to address issues of missed class time by establishing limits on the number of games played. Faculty continued to gain oversight of athletics throughout the 1880s and 1890s, attempting to address the issues of professionalism, commercialism, academic standing, and transfers for athletics participation (Weathersby, 2016).

As the turn of the century approached, popularity of college football grew, and pressure to produce winning teams also escalated. Academic integrity was compromised as schools admitted players who were not academically qualified, professors were pressured to pass players solely to keep them eligible, and special classes were created just for football players. Lack of ethics and integrity was apparent on the field as well, with players intentionally targeting and injuring their opponents; some players died, prompting faculty demands to abolish football. Reform was needed, but Charles W. Elliot, president of Harvard University, believed that college presidents were powerless given the fanaticism of students, alumni, and trustees (Smith, 2011) – a sentiment shared by current university presidents who "are afraid to rock the boat with boards, benefactors, and political supporters who want to win" (Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, 2009, p. 16; Weight, Weight, & Schneider, 2013).

Due to the inability or unwillingness of college presidents to enact reform in the early 1900s, President Theodore Roosevelt, a Harvard alumnus and football fan, invited representatives from Harvard, Yale and Princeton to the White House for an intervention on October 9, 1905. After confronting the schools with examples of their egregious behaviors, the President extracted an agreement to display sportsmanship and abide by the rules of the game. The news of the White House meeting prompted a broader reform movement, leading to a meeting of approximately 60 colleges and universities in New York. These schools established the Intercollegiate Athletic Association on December 28, 1905; later renamed the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) in 1910 (Smith, 2000).

A core foundational principle of the NCAA was that each member institution had autonomy in determining athletics offerings and how the program was run on its campus; historically known as Home Rule (Smith, 2011), the principle remains to this day as Institutional Autonomy (NCAA Division I Compliance Manual 2018–2019, 2018). Throughout the early 1900s, some institutions built huge football stadiums seating crowds up to 70,000 spectators. Coaches were paid disproportionately large salaries and 85% of colleges paid their football players in some form (Byers & Hammer, 1995; Noll, 2013). A three-year study released by the Carnegie Foundation in 1929 criticized the rampant commercialization and professionalization of college football and the lack of institutional leadership in operating programs consistent with the mission of higher education (Savage, Bentley, McGovern, & Smiley, 1929). Contemporary calls for reform echo many of the issues faced in these early years (Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, 1991, 2001, 2010).

Throughout the 1930s, college presidents attempted to address recruiting and compensation of athletes without success. The Gates Plan, pushed by the President of the University of Pennsylvania, sought to abolish recruitment of athletes, replace athletics scholarships with need-based aid, and re-integrate football players into the student body by eliminating athletic dorms and training table (Smith, 2011). Athletics scholarships limited to expenses were authorized by the Southeastern Conference (SEC) in 1936, while the Southern Conference chose to allow athletics scholarships if they were funded by outside supporters (Smith, 2011). An amendment to the NCAA constitution was passed at the 1939 convention, limiting scholarships to need-based aid. However, reliance on self-policing and a lack of organizational enforcement mechanisms allowed recruiting inducements and athletics scholarships to become common practice through the 1940s (Noll, 2013).

The NCAA transitioned from an ineffective policy and issue-oriented body to a regulatory and enforcement organization in the 1950s. Walter Byers was hired in 1951 as the NCAA's first full-time executive director, and under Byers' leadership, the NCAA established new procedures for investigating complaints of rules violations. The NCAA Council reviewed the findings and had the authority to place violators on probation or suspend them. The University of Kentucky was the first institution suspended under the new system for providing impermissible financial aid to 10 basketball players. Enforcement continued to evolve with the establishment of the Committee on Infractions and a full-time staff at the national office to support it in 1954 (Smith, 2011).

In August 1973, the NCAA held its first special convention to discuss federating the membership into three separate competitive divisions, warranted by the growth in NCAA membership and the disparate sizes, missions, and competitiveness of the institutions. The membership voted to create three divisions, self-determined, and differentiated by athletics philosophy (Smith, 2011). These divisions and their differentiating philosophies remain today.

Division I schools are typically larger, provide more athletics participation opportunities, have significantly larger budgets and facilities, and provide athletic scholarships funding for athletes in all sports. Philosophically, Division I schools see athletics both as an educational opportunity for their student-athletes and an entertaining and inspiring component of campus life (Our Three Divisions, n.d.). In 1978, Division I further subdivided its membership based on level of football competition; these divisions are now called the (1) Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) for schools competing in the College Football Playoff and post-season bowl games not managed by the NCAA, (2) Football Championship Division (FCS) for schools competing in NCAA post-season football championships, and (3) schools that do not sponsor football (Smith, 2011).

Division II members philosophically seek balance in providing high level competitive opportunities for student–athletes while maintaining high academic achievement and the ability to be more fully engaged in the campus community. Student–athletes are awarded athletics scholarships, but on a more limited basis due to smaller budgets. Because scholarships are a significant percentage of athletics department budgets, Division II members typically offer fewer sport opportunities overall, and have less elaborate athletics facilities (Our Three Divisions, n.d.).

Division III embraces a nonscholarship model in which academics is the priority and athletes participate in sport for the love of the game. Student–athletes are still awarded financial aid based on need but cannot be funded based on athletics ability. Division III members emphasize academics first, limiting the length of the playing season and number of competitions to reduce missed class time. Student–athletes are encouraged to fully integrate with the student body in campus life (Our Three Divisions, n.d.). Student–athletes in Division III truly compete for love of the game, as both resources and spectators are scarce.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, women students began to form teams and compete against other schools. A Special Committee on Women's Sports was created by the NCAA in April 1964, but there was little interest from the membership in sponsoring women's varsity athletics programs or NCAA championships for women. Women's programs typically operated as club teams under the supervision of Women's Physical Education departments. In 1972, women formed their own national governing body, the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW), the same year Title IX of the Education Amendments was passed, a federal law preventing sex discrimination in programs or activities at educational institutions in the United States. The AIAW thrived, growing from its initial offering of national championships in eight sports in 1972 to 19 sports in 1982. The women's basketball tournament generated a profit beginning in 1973, and the Association was able to secure a television contract with NBC for its national championships. With almost 1000 institutional members and financial stability, the AIAW's future looked secure. However, on January 13, 1981 the NCAA membership voted to offer national championships for women's athletics without charging separate membership fees. Most NCAA members shifted their women's athletics affiliation to the NCAA in 1982, and the AIAW officially dissolved in 1983 (Carpenter, 1993).

The establishment of cable television in the 1980s, skyrocketing media rights agreements, and a struggling U.S. economy escalated a growing financial gap between resource-rich and resource-poor athletics departments in the NCAA Division I membership. For many years, the NCAA membership operated under a bylaw limiting the number of televised football games for each school each season. The NCAA negotiated the national television contract for the membership, and members received a subsidy under the contract. With the invention of cable television and national and regional sports networks, high profile Division I schools banded together to form the College Football Association (CFA) to negotiate television contracts that would better serve their interests. The NCAA reminded the institutions their actions violated NCAA rules and the parties decided to work out their issues in court, with the CFA schools suing the NCAA for violations of antitrust law in NCAA v. Board of Regents (1984). The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the schools, finding that the NCAA rule negatively impacted the college football television rights market in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Former college football player Justice Byron "Whizzer" White wrote in dissent:

> Although some of the NCAA's activities, viewed in isolation, bear a resemblance to those undertaken by professional sports leagues and associations, the Court errs in treating intercollegiate athletics under the NCAA's control as a purely commercial venture in which colleges and universities participate solely, or even primarily, in the pursuit of profits (NCAA v. Board of Regents, 1984, p. 121).

White would have given deference to the regulatory authority of the organization to maintain college athletics as a "vital part of the educational system" (NCAA v. Board of Regents, 1984, p. 121), recognizing that institutions who deviated from that goal in pursuit of wins and profit led to "a wide range of competitive excesses that prove harmful to students and institutions alike" (NCAA v. Board of Regents, 1984, p. 121).

The increases in financial stakes associated with television contracts and winning in football and men's basketball led to significant scandals through the 1980s. Some of the most successful programs in the country were punished by the NCAA for bribing recruits, boosters paying student–athletes for jobs not performed, providing jobs for student–athletes' relatives, and changing grades to maintain athletic eligibility. The scandal at Southern Methodist University (SMU) resulted in the "death penalty" – a one-year complete ban for football competition, two-year bowl ban, two-year loss of television revenue, a reduction of 55 football scholarships over four years, a reduction in coaching staff by three assistant coaches for two years, and the enablement of all football players to transfer without sacrificing the traditional year of eligibility mandated for football transfers. The athletics director, president of SMU, and the leader of the SMU board of trustees (who was also a former governor of Texas) were all implicated in a cover-up of illicit signing bonuses paid to recruits, cash subsidies and automobiles provided to football players, and players profiting from the sale of football tickets (Smith, 2011).

Appalled by the scandals, the Knight Foundation, a nonprofit organization committed to fostering informed and engaged communities, formed the Commission on College Athletics in 1989. William C. Friday, former president of the University of North Carolina and Theodore M. Hesburgh, former president of the University of Notre Dame, were chosen to lead a select group of 12 college presidents, 4 chief executive officers of corporations, and a representative from a board of trustees, an alumni association, the NCAA, the United States Olympic Committee, the U.S. House of Representatives, and television (Smith, 2011). The Commission issued their report in 1991 offering a One-Plus-Three model to solve the problems in college athletics. This model cited presidential control as the key to athletics reform in three areas: academic integrity, financial integrity, and independent certification of compliance (Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, 1991). The key to successful presidential reform was support from the institutional governing board, but the report offered no suggestions for guiding institutional governing boards toward athletics integrity (Smith, 2011). The NCAA adopted some of the suggestions of the report, reorganizing the organizational governance structure to put presidents firmly in control, and raising standards for student–athlete academic eligibility (Smith, 2011).

The Knight Commission reconvened and issued its second report, *A Call to Action*, in 2001 with a myriad of specific reforms to improve academic integrity, improve student–athlete welfare, reduce costs, and restrict commercialism. Few of the solutions offered were original ideas, but the most unique suggestion was advocacy for Congress to enact an exemption from antitrust laws (Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, 2001). It is not surprising the NCAA membership rejected recommendations for the NCAA to create an advisory group of outsiders to promote reform, preferring to promote change in Division I through a new governance structure. The membership created a new Academic Progress Rate (APR) to improve graduation rates with penalties including loss of scholarships and ineligibility for postseason competition for teams that did not comply. This resulted in enhanced student–athlete academic support programs, but also in clustering student-athletes in specific programs to assure their success (Smith, 2011). While the Knight Commission reports have not resulted in dramatic reform of college athletics, the organization has succeeded in providing a national forum to shine a light on perceived deficiencies and discuss solutions.

Individuals who put winning ahead of all other objectives, physically and verbally abusive coaches, and pressure for student–athletes to prioritize athletics over all other pursuits have persisted since the very beginning of college athletics. A college arms race in spending on facilities, coach's salaries, amenities, and services for student–athletes to attract the best recruits also remains uncontrolled. While outsiders (faculty advocacy groups, the media, and fans) continue to blame the NCAA in general for every perceived failing in college athletics, an understanding of the governance structure may provide some perspective on how the business of college athletics functions.

3. Governance of College Athletics

Over 600,000 student–athletes compete in intercollegiate athletics in the United States, with approximately 500,000 competing at NCAA member institutions (What is the NCAA? n.d.). Although the NCAA is perceived as synonymous with college athletics, it is important to note it is not the only governing body for intercollegiate athletics. A list of the various national organizations that provide governance for college athletics is provided in Table 1. All of these groups are voluntary membership organizations; colleges or universities with athletics programs ideally choose to join an organization that aligns with their institutional mission and helps the institution

Table 1. Governing bodies for college sport in the United States.

Organization	Year established	No. of members	No. of sports	No. of student–athletes
National Collegiate Athletic Association	1910	1117	23	500,000
National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics	1937	251	17	65,000
National Junior College Athletic Association	1938	301	15	57,000
National Christian College Athletic Association	1968	92	11	Not published
United States Collegiate Athletic Association	2001	81	7	Not published

achieve its goals. Members typically receive access to membership services and post-season regional and national championships for their student–athletes.

The NCAA is the 1117 colleges and universities and the 100 athletics conferences that are its members. The membership, through a representative governance structure, dictates the mission and values of the NCAA, and leads strategic planning. The highest level of leadership is the Board of Governors, comprised of chancellors or presidents of member institutions. These representatives are appointed by the Division I Board of Directors and Division II and III Presidents Councils. Representation on the Board of Governors heavily favors the Division I FBS institutions with eight representatives, and only two representatives for each of the remaining membership categories: FCS institutions, Division I nonfootball institutions, Division II, and Division III. Ex officio nonvoting members of the Board of Governors include the Chairs of the Division I Council and the Division II and III Management Councils. The President of the NCAA is also an ex officio member, but can vote in the event of a tie (NCAA Division I Compliance Manual 2018-2019, 2018, Bylaw 4.1).

Reporting directly to the Board of Governors are the divisional boards responsible for the strategic vision, policies, and regulations for each division. The Division I Board of Directors includes institutional presidents or chancellors, as well as two athletics administrators, a faculty athletics representative, and a student–athlete. The Division II Presidents' Council consists of institutional presidents or chancellors based on regional representation, with one member for every 22 institutions in the region (NCAA Division II Compliance Manual 2018-2019, 2018). The Division III Presidents Council includes 18 presidents or chancellors, with a minimum of two representatives from each of the geographic divisions and seven "at large" members to assure representation based on institutional diversity (NCAA Division III Compliance Manual 2018-2019, 2018). Representation of specific stakeholders exists through the Senior Woman Administrator (SWA) and Faculty Athletics Representative (FAR) designations and inclusion by position on various NCAA committees and boards. Student–Athlete Advisory Councils are mandated at each member institution, and at the conference and national level, to provide student–athletes a voice in creating policy (NCAA Division I Compliance Manual 2018-2019, 2018).

To conduct its business, NCAA members meet annually to vote on legislation, and engage in round-table discussions of matters of general interest. Legislation that applies to all NCAA members requires a two-thirds majority vote of all delegates present at the annual convention, with each institution having one vote. Members of Divisions II and III meet in separate business sessions to discuss their respective legislative proposals and amendments democratically in a one-school, one-vote system. Division I members vote only for Association-wide matters, as they enact legislation through the Council and Board of Directors (NCAA Division I Compliance Manual 2018-2019, 2018).

The NCAA members are served by approximately 500 Association employees at the national office in Indianapolis, Indiana. The national office staff is organized into 10 administrative groups: executive team, executive affairs, governance, membership services, championships, enforcement, finance and information services, marketing, and public affairs. While the NCAA is often blamed for the policies of the organization, the national office does not have independent rule-making authority over the membership and exists solely to provide services for the institutional members and the student-athletes at those institutions (NCAA National Office, n.d.).

4. Benefits of College Athletics

The most unique aspect of intercollegiate athletics is the ability to transform a person's life through access to higher education and lessons learned through athletics participation. High school athletes who are recruited in Division I and Division II may be offered athletics scholarships, which can significantly reduce the cost of attending college. In Division I, student–athletes who receive a full scholarship are provided with tuition, fees, room and board, books and a stipend covering the cost of attendance (NCAA Division I Compliance Manual 2018-2019, 2018). Many student–athletes receive partial scholarships to reduce their overall costs, while some receive no financial subsidy at all. In Division III, student–athletes are not eligible for athletics scholarships per NCAA rules (NCAA Division III Compliance Manual 2018-2019, 2018). All student–athletes with financial need may receive assistance through the institution's financial aid office, and those with significant financial need can also obtain additional federal financial aid in the form of Pell Grants. A Special Assistance Fund provides additional financial support for athletes with special circumstances. All recruits seeking opportunities at any division potentially benefit by gaining admission to a higher quality academic institution because of their special talent.

In addition to access and financial subsidies, athletes are supported by significant additional benefits through their athletics participation. To support their educational opportunity, institutions provide tutoring and academic counseling, life skills programs to assist in transition to work after sport, and leadership academies to develop personal and team leadership skills. To support athletic excellence, institutions often provide strength and conditioning programs, sports medicine services, nutrition counseling, and psychological support services. As one might imagine, the cost of providing this support is quite substantial.

Academic research also provides insight into additional benefits of intercollegiate athletics participation. Research on the student–athlete population has demonstrated (a) increased educational engagement and graduation rates (Howard-Hamilton & Sina, 2001; Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005); (b) increased self-esteem and character development (Hirko, 2009; Potuto & O'Hanlon, 2007); (c) higher rates of growth and cognitive development (Chaddock, Neider, Voss, Gaspar, & Kramer, 2011; Rosewater, 2009, University Learning Outcomes Assessment, 2011); and (d) enhanced marketability upon graduation and a competitive advantage in the workplace for athletes who make it through the system and graduate (Chalfin, Weight, Osborne, & Johnson, 2015; Shulman & Bowen, 2011). Employers proactively seek former student–athletes to hire because they associate a variety of skills and qualities with former athletes including a competitive mindset, ability to perform under pressure, coachability, strong work ethic, and other skills (Chalfin et al., 2015). Athletes who graduate also out-earn and are more engaged in their work than their nonathlete graduate peers, and report higher levels of life satisfaction and social support and lower levels of depression, fatigue, and difficulty with physical activity 10, 20, 30, and 40-years postgraduation (DeFreese, Weight, Kerr, & Kroshus, 2019; Shulman & Bowen, 2011; Weight, Bonfiglio, DeFreese, Kerr, & Osborne, 2018). These studies provide evidence of a holistic educational experience through athletics.

5. Financial Structures

The NCAA is supported almost entirely by the media and marketing rights from the Division I Men's Basketball Championship, known throughout the world as "March Madness." Of the $1.1 billion dollars in annual revenue the NCAA reported in 2017, roughly 85% came directly from the broadcast rights to this tournament, and 10% came from championships ticket sales. The remaining revenues come from membership dues, investments, and subsidiaries (NCAA Finances, 2018). Given the limited revenue streams, the association's governance is heavily influenced by the revenue producers – Division I programs that command the most media attention. Of the 90 championship events in 23 sports that are sponsored by the NCAA, only five break-even or make a profit (see Figure 1). Each of these are men's Division I sports: basketball, ice hockey, lacrosse, wrestling, and baseball. The NCAA directs much of this revenue back to the member schools, with the largest percentage of revenue distribution going to conferences whose men's basketball programs perform well in the basketball tournament (NCAA Finances, 2018).

The Division I College Football Playoff (CFP) is another large revenue producer in college sport, yielding over $600 million per year from its four-team bracket competition to determine a national champion in NCAA Division I FBS football. However, it

Figure 1. Self-sustaining and unprofitable NCAA championships. (Where does the money go, 2018).

Table 2. NCAA Division I Public Institution Athletic Department Revenue (2016–2017).

Institution	Conference	Total revenue	Total expenses	Profit (%)	Allocated (%)
Highest revenue producing institutions					
Texas	Big 12	$214,830,647	$207,022,323	4	0.0
Texas A&M	SEC	$211,960,034	$146,546,229	31	0.0
Ohio State	Big Ten	$185,409,602	$173,507,435	6	0.0
Michigan	Big Ten	$185,173,187	$175,425,392	5	0.2
Alabama	SEC	$174,307,419	$158,646,962	9	1.7
Lowest Revenue Producing Institutions					
Alabama A&M	SWAC	$3,293,950	$9,466,448	−187	10.4
Coppin State	MEAC	$3,452,610	$4,360,469	−26	71.6
Mississippi Valley State	SWAC	$4,332,784	$4,335,851	0	49.5
Savannah State	MEAC	$4,508,343	$6,150,265	−36	63.3
Chicago State	WAC	$5,249,433	$5,057,856	4	80.9

Note: Allocated % – percentage of revenue generated through direct and indirect institutional or state financial allocations and student fees (Berkowitz & Schnaars, 2018).

is independently operated, and the NCAA does not receive revenue from these events. The CFP revenue is distributed to the 10 conferences who participate in the CFP, with the largest payments going to the conferences whose teams are selected to perform in the semifinal games and non-playoff bowls (College Football Playoff, 2018).

At the university level, revenue streams for top-tier athletic programs are very similar, with the predominant sources of income streaming from football and men's basketball broadcast rights and ticket sales (Fulks, 2017). Only a select few programs, however, generate more revenue than they spend (see Table 2). In the 2017 Revenues and Expenses Report compiled by the NCAA, for example, in the Division I FBS only 54% of football programs and 47% of men's basketball programs generate revenue greater than their expenses. This means most athletics programs are highly subsidized by student fees, university general funds, and state government appropriations (Fulks, 2017).

The critical importance of financial sustainability within institutions of higher education who house intercollegiate athletics and the ever-increasing costs to compete in college sport have led many athletics administrators to focus on how to maximize revenue, which translates into how to facilitate competitive success in men's basketball and football teams. The publicity and financial incentives for universities who make it to the March Madness bracket in men's basketball or have a successful football season are alluring, and have prompted an arms race of expenditures, wherein institutions outspend one another to gain a competitive advantage. The gains from each additional investment, however, are self-cancelling when everyone invests for an advantage, yielding a never-ending spending cycle simply to continue to keep up with the competition (Murdock, 2007; Weight et al., 2013).

Institutions spend to increase competitive success by building lavish facilities to attract the best recruits, paying exorbitant salaries for the "best" coaches, and sometimes even recruiting more athletes than available scholarships or allowed roster spots (Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, 2010; Weight et al., 2013). Despite steadily increasing revenues, losses outpace the growth of revenue in each Division I subdivision, placing a heavy financial burden on the institutions. A common perception is that athletics is a cash cow, but most rely heavily on allocated funds from student fees, and/or institutional appropriations to cover millions in annual losses

(Berkowitz & Schnaars, 2018; Fulks, 2017). Faculty and others have consistently questioned whether the heavy investment in athletics is worth the cost, and whether the escalating expenses will ever subside. The intense competitive and financial pressure faced by athletics administrators has fostered a stress-filled environment that funnels down to coaches and athletes. Coaches who do not win are fired, and there are high levels of burnout within the entire infrastructure from athletes and coaches, to athletic trainers and administrators (DeFreese & Smith, 2013; Hendrix, Acevedo, & Hebert, 2000; Vealey, Armstrong, Comar, & Greenleaf, 1998).

The median total expenses for Division II athletics departments is slightly more than $6 million. Approximately 30% of the budget is spent on financial aid, 20% on coaches' compensation, 12% on administration compensation, and 38% on athletics programming (Fulks, 2015). The average Division II institution receives 10% of the revenues from outside the institution, with donations and ticket sales making up the largest sources of income. While the institution funds 90% of the athletics program spending, the athletics subsidy is typically between 4% and 8% of the total institutional budget (Fulks, 2015).

The median total expenses for Division III athletics programs is almost $3.6 million for institutions with football and slightly more than $2 million for institutions without football. Football is the most expensive sport, with a median expense of about $431,100; the impact of football on all other sports and in institutional spending is apparent. Salaries account for 46% of the median Division III budget, with institutional support (15%) and travel (11%) the next biggest expenses. Student-athletes represent 26% of the students in the student body at Division III institutions with football, and only 13% of the students at institutions without football. Total athletics expenditures represent approximately 5% of the total Division III institutional budget for schools with football, and 3% for schools without football (Fulks, 2016).

6. Marketing via Intercollegiate Athletics

While the ever-present financial pressures facing intercollegiate athletics may be very similar to many other industries, several aspects of marketing the intercollegiate athletics industry are quite unique. For example, many marketing-related functions in intercollegiate athletics are outsourced to privately held firms, outside institutions of higher learning. At the same time, the intercollegiate athletics industry attracts similar levels of demand from corporate brands seeking to utilize sport marketing intellectual property to connect with consumers.

The Center for Research in Intercollegiate Athletics (CRIA) estimates that during the 2017–2018 academic year brands invested more than $500 million in guaranteed rights fees towards the 130 institutions in the NCAA's FBS (CRIA, 2018). Given that rightsholders such as IMG College/Learfield, Fox Sports, OUTFRONT Media, and Van Wagner expect to make a requisite return on their investment by selling sponsorships that generate returns exceeding the guaranteed rights fee, it is probable that brands are investing significantly more to connect with consumers utilizing intercollegiate athletics properties, such as universities, conferences, and postseason championships. International Events Group (IEG) estimated that figure to be $1.24 billion in

2017, a 4.5% increase from 2016 to 2017 (International Events Group (IEG), 2018). This figure puts investments by brands in intercollegiate athletics second only to the National Football League (NFL) in the U.S., and above such established leagues as Major League Baseball (MLB) at $892 million and the National Basketball Association (NBA) at $861 million (International Events Group (IEG), 2017).

Why have brands' willingness to invest in the U.S. system of intercollegiate athletics increased exponentially over the past several years, to the point that rightshoulders are willing to pay individual institutions an eight-figure guarantee annually? How do the motivations to invest in intercollegiate athletics differ than those in professional sport?

6.1. Demographics of College Sports Fans

Many brands are attracted to professional sport and mega-events such as the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup by their ability to reach large numbers of consumers (Jensen & Cornwell, 2017). For intercollegiate athletics, it is less about reach and more about the quality of the consumer, which includes a large number of college students and alumni.

The 18- to 24-year-old consumer that constitutes the vast majority of US-based university students is increasingly difficult to reach, as they are more likely to consume media via subscription-based video on demand (SVOD) offerings and therefore less likely to view traditional commercials (Jensen, Walsh, & Cobbs, 2018). Students also have a longer customer lifetime value (CLV) than older consumers, which is very attractive for firms who want to attract consumers at a younger age and keep them as a customer for years, such as banks, credit cards, and insurance companies (Jensen, Wakefield, Cobbs, & Turner, 2016). Students are also influencers on social media. They have large social networks and are looked upon by their friends to help them decide which brands to trust and what to spend money on. If sponsors can connect with them, they can become evangelists for their brands, potentially for decades.

Older consumers who already have a college degree are also an attractive demographic for brands. While they may have a smaller CLV, they have more disposable income and are attractive for larger purchases such as homes, automobiles, and luxury items. In contrast, the demographics of professional sport leagues closely approximate the general population: older and less educated.

6.2. Opportunity for Brand Integration

With the rise of SVOD services and digital video recorder (DVR) penetration approaching 50% of U.S. households, traditional commercials are largely ignored or simply forwarded through by viewers (Jensen et al., 2016). However, brand integration, defined by Wiles and Danielova (2009, p. 44) as "the inclusion of branded products or identifiers through audio or visual means within mass media programming," causes a brand to be exposed during the actual event. Brand integration is increasingly coveted by marketers who seek opportunities for their brand to be exposed within the event itself, rather than solely during commercial breaks (Jensen et al., 2016).

While brand integration has been popularized in reality television (i.e., Coca-Cola and "American Idol," Starbucks and "The Voice," and Dunkin' Donuts and "America's Got Talent"), live sports events are the original source of brand integration, from Gatorade on the sidelines to Nike on a jersey. Many intercollegiate athletic events provide brand integration unavailable to sponsors of professional sports, in the form of branding on the actual field of play, basket stanchions, and other desirable locations (Jensen, Walsh, Cobbs, & Turner, 2015). Brands can also engage in title sponsorships of postseason bowl games and other intercollegiate athletic events (Popp, Jensen, & Jackson, 2017; Jensen & Caneja, 2018). Given that title sponsorships have been referred to as the "crown jewels of sports sponsorships programs" (Clark, Cornwell, & Pruitt, 2009, p. 169), this is yet another opportunity unavailable in professional sport that is plentiful across the intercollegiate athletics industry and provides unique opportunities for brand integration that are difficult to find elsewhere.

6.3. Efficiency

In today's fractured media environment, the multimedia nature of the agreements is also attractive to brands. In many professional sport environments, sponsors and their agencies are forced to engage in multiple agreements with various entities in order to secure rights across television, radio, digital, social media, and live events (such as stadium/arena signage and on-court/field promotional opportunities). That takes time, and costs sponsors money.

For example, even the largest sponsors of MLB and their teams are forced to enter into separate agreements with MLB Advanced Media if they wish to execute online promotions or receive other digital rights, such as the ability to use MLB team logos online.

Sponsors entering into agreements with IMG/Learfield and other rights holders can secure an integrated sponsorship of an institution's athletic teams inclusive of digital assets, television or radio advertising, and signage, all in one agreement (Jensen, Spreyer, Lipsey, Popp, & Malekoff, 2019). For brands seeking national coverage, rights holders can package large groups of institutions together in one agreement, making it even easier for brands to make an efficient purchase. They can then quickly start the process of leveraging the sponsorships to achieve business objectives.

6.4. Breaking through the Clutter

Some professional sports such as NASCAR have struggled with declining viewership and attendance at events, leading to issues attracting sponsors (Pockrass, 2017). Even for brands who believe in NASCAR and have supported it in the past, standing out is difficult amongst the clutter, given the vast number of sponsors involved. Recent research on mega-sport events provides evidence that clutter is predictive of shorter-running sponsorships (Jensen & Cornwell, 2017). Clutter inhibits the success of sponsorships given that it impairs cognition, as research has proven we can only accept and retain so much information, and makes servicing sponsors effectively more challenging (Breuer & Rumpf, 2012). For example, Cornwell and Relyea (2000) found increased perceived clutter by consumers negatively affected the number of sponsors both recognized and recalled. Breuer and Rumpf (2012) measured on-screen clutter by the number of sponsors exposed during television broadcasts, and found a significant negative effect for each additional brand exposed. Similarly, qualitative research by Séguin and O'Reilly (2008) confirmed that clutter is an important issue to marketers.

Seeking to break through the clutter, sponsors of intercollegiate athletic events are able to secure sponsorships that provide name-in-title designation, and provide a sponsor with the opportunity to rise above the clutter (Jensen & Cornwell, in press). From title sponsorships of bowl games to conference championship tournaments to neutral site contests, college sports provide a multitude of the title sponsorship opportunities desired by marketers.

However, such marketing opportunities, along with the exposure generated for the programs participating in the events, are available only to a select few intercollegiate athletics programs. For example, only the highest tier of U.S.-based intercollegiate athletics programs, those housed within the FBS, have the ability to participate in post-season bowl games, a total of 130 at present. Smaller Division I schools may engage in more limited sponsorships and marketing programs, while Division II and DIII institutions generally are limited to partnerships with local sponsors and minimal marketing opportunities. As global governing bodies explore the integration of intercollegiate athletics within their countries, the marketing and branding models of US college sport offer tremendous potential for replication.

7. Governance Challenges in Intercollegiate Athletics

Coupled with the benefits and market-potential of intercollegiate athletics, there are a number of significant challenges. As mentioned above, calls for reform have been ever-present in the history of college sport in the United States (Byers & Hammer, 1995; Desrochers, 2013; Oriard, 2001; Smith, 2011; Thelin, 1996). The organizational philosophy of housing intercollegiate athletics within the academy has largely been based upon the notion of athletics as a unique element of a holistic education (Adler & Adler, 1991; Weight, Cooper, & Popp, 2015; Weight, Navarro, Huffman, & Smith-Ryan, 2014; Weight et al., 2015). Interestingly, however, the pursuit of athletic excellence has never been considered a worthy field of study in the United States. There are currently no academic avenues through which athletes can major in athletics performance, basketball, or soccer, for example. In form, the study of athletic performance is similar to dance, music, and theatre each of which have robust educational platforms wherein students can earn academic credit for the refinement of their art (Brand, 2006), but athletics has traditionally been viewed as "non-academic," "extracurricular," and even a "detractor from the mission of higher education" (Brand, 2006; Smith & Willingham, 2015; Zimbalist, 1999). Structurally, this philosophical divide is evident, as most Division I athletics departments operate as autonomous or auxiliary units separate and often miles away from the rest of campus (Frey, 2012). Administratively, some efficient and transformational leaders embrace inspiring educational values and proactively promote those values through day-to-day decision making while some publicly proclaim certain values to be important, yet consistently act contrary to those values (Cooper, Weight, & Pierce, 2014).

Symptomatic of these varying cultures are a variety of athlete outcomes. As previously described, student–athletes who can balance the intense rigors of NCAA-mandated full-time academic work and full-time athletic commitments receive significant financial, academic, and life-long advantages compared to the general student body. However, some student–athletes do not thrive within the college sport environment and fail out, drop out, or complete their athletics experiences burned out or injured. These negative outcomes often stem from poor institutional leadership, insufficient academic preparation, or other complicating factors which contribute to an inability to handle the intense student–athlete workload and environment. These devastating outcomes, most prevalent among minority athletes in the Division I revenue generating sports of football and men's basketball, have led to a growing body of literature, public scrutiny, and litigation surrounding athlete rights and compensation (College Sport Research Institute, 2014; Fountain & Finley, 2009; Lanter & Hawkins, 2013).

8. Athlete Rights and Compensation

While the revenue streams and salaries in big-time intercollegiate athletics have grown exponentially, the financial subsidy provided to student–athletes have remained virtually unchanged since athletics scholarships were introduced in the 1950s. This limit in compensation is grounded in the concept of amateurism, or "the collegiate model," intended to create a line of demarcation between professional and collegiate sports as summarized in a 2010 NCAA briefing document:

> The Collegiate Model of Athletics is intended to impart two principles: (1) Those who participate in college sports are students, and (2) intercollegiate athletics is embedded in the values and mission of higher education …. In the professional model, the athletes are a work force, a commodity that can be traded from team to team. In the collegiate model, the athlete is a student. In the professional model, the goal is to generate revenue through entertainment. In the collegiate model, the goal is to acquire an education, including learning the value of hard work and teamwork, self-sacrifice and self-discipline, resilience and persistence, and the pursuit of excellence. In the professional model, the team is connected to a community only so long as the community supports the franchise through the building and maintenance of facilities and the purchase of tickets. In the collegiate model, the team is enduringly connected to a community through the sponsoring college or university. (National Collegiate Athletic Association [NCAA], 2010, p. 2).

While this model is palpable and largely true to form in most sports and competitive divisions, the concept of amateurism has been the target of increasing public scrutiny and litigation as applied to male athletes in Division I football and men's basketball (Branch, 2011; O'Bannon v. NCAA, 2014; Sack & Staurowsky, 1998; Shropshire & Williams, 2017; Southall & Staurowsky, 2013). Limitations on high-profile student–athletes from capitalizing on their own image and likeness because of NCAA rules has been labelled "a new plantation system" wherein predominantly black athletes generate revenue to support predominantly white coaches, administrators, and unprofitable athletes in predominantly white institutions (Hawkins, 2013). Legal pressure and public commentary have propelled moderate changes to the compensation and benefits structure for athletes, including expansion of scholarship funding to include the full cost of attendance, but these measures coupled with sometimes inadequate educational experiences may pale in comparison with the true market value of some top-tier athletes (Leeds, Von Allmen, & Matheson, 2018; McCormick & McCormick, 2006; Sanderson & Siegfried, 2015). Of course, these critics fail to include access to the U.S. system of higher education provided to student–athletes, the value of a college education itself, and the benefits of participating in college athletics in their analysis. As a number of court cases proceed through the U.S. legal system, and scandals relative to student–athlete treatment, compensation, and educational opportunities continue, there will be sustained scrutiny and calls for reform relative to issues of student–athlete time management, compensation, and access to a free market.

9. Conclusions

Member institutions who make, bend, amend, and break the rules lead intercollegiate athletics governance. A shared interest brings the schools together to facilitate education, community experiences, and institutional branding through athletics. These institutions simultaneously compete with one another for wins, which at the highest level can be worth millions of dollars. The self-interest of the individual schools or divisions of schools can influence the types of rules that are passed that govern fair play. As college athletics continues to evolve, and other countries consider adopting or creating similar education-based athletics programs, a general litmus test should be utilized. First, ask whether the athletics program will align with the educational goals of the institution. Then, hire leaders to create and lead programs that operate consistently with the values and objectives of the institution. Finally, ask what is best for the individual student–athletes in their unique situations. Do the policies, procedures, and programs facilitate the best possible experience and outcome for the talented individuals competing within this unique segment of the sport industry? Finally, consistent with the mission of higher education to prepare graduates to participate fully in advancing society, how will these experiences aid the student–athlete in succeeding in life beyond the playing fields?

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on Contributors

Barbara Osborne (J.D., Boston College, U.S.) is a Professor and Coordinator for the Graduate Program in the Sport Administration specialization at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill with a joint appointment at the School of Law. Prior to her appointment at UNC in 1998, she worked for 14 years as an athletics administrator in intercollegiate athletics. She also has experience as a coach, public relations coordinator, television sports commentator, publisher, and sports information director. Osborne's line of research focuses on legal issues in college athletics, Title IX, and discrimination and sport.

Jonathan A. Jensen (Ph.D., The Ohio State University, U.S.) is an Assistant Professor of Sport Administration in the Department of Exercise and Sport Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His interests span sport marketing and sponsorship analytics, as well as sport consumer behavior. He is a North American Society of Sport Management (NASSM) Research Fellow, has twice been named a finalist in the research papers competition at the MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference, and was named an Emerging Scholar in Sport Marketing by the American Marketing Association's Sport & Sponsorship-Linked Marketing Special Interest Group.

Erianne A. Weight (Ph.D., Indiana University, U.S.) is an Associate Professor of Sport Administration and Director of the Center for Research in Intercollegiate Athletics as The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Her research is directed by a vision to increase opportunities for athletic participation and education through understanding the financial, educational, and administrative impacts and opportunities for growth within intercollegiate athletics. She is a Research Consultant for Collegiate Sports Associates within Division I US intercollegiate athletics with a focus on athletics and higher education organizational culture, climate, and student well-being.

ORCID

Barbara Osborne http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6415-6184
Jonathan A. Jensen https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9949-077X
Erianne A. Weight http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2368-6730

References

Adler, P., & Adler, P. (1991). *Backboards & blackboards: College athletes and role engulfment*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Berkowitz, S., & Schnaars, C. (2018). NCAA Finances. *USA Today*. Retrieved from http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/finances/

Branch, T. (2011). The shame of college sports. *The Atlantic*, *308*(3), 80–110.

Brand, M. (2006). The role and value of intercollegiate athletics in universities. *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*, *33*(1), 9–20. doi:10.1080/00948705.2006.9714687

Breuer, C., & Rumpf, C. (2012). The viewer's reception and processing of sponsorship information in sport telecasts. *Journal of Sport Management*, *26*(6), 521–531. doi:10.1123/jsm.26.6.521

Byers, W., & Hammer, C. (1995). *Unsportsmanlike conduct: Exploiting college athletes*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Carpenter, L. J. (1993). Letters home: My life with Title IX. In G. L. Cohen (Ed.). *Women in sport: Issues and controversies* (pp 133–155), Newberry Park, CA: Sage Publishing.

Chaddock, L., Neider, M. B., Voss, M. W., Gaspar, J. G., & Kramer, A. F. (2011). Do athletes excel at everyday tasks? *Medicine and Science in Sports and Exercise*, *43*(10), 1920. doi:10.1249/MSS.0b013e318218ca74

Chalfin, P., Weight, E. A., Osborne, B., & Johnson, S. (2015). The value of intercollegiate athletics participation from the perspective of employers who target athletes. *Journal of Issues in Intercollegiate Athletics*, 8, 1–27.

Clark, J. M., Cornwell, T. B., & Pruitt, S. W. (2009). The impact of title event sponsorship announcements on shareholder wealth. *Marketing Letters*, *20*(2), 169–182. doi:10.1007/s11002-008-9064-z

Center for Research in Intercollegiate Athletics (2018). *Intercollegiate multimedia rights agreement report* (2nd ed.). Chapel Hill, NC: Center for Research in Intercollegiate Athletics..

College Football Playoff. (2018). Revenue distribution. Retrieved from https://collegefootballplayoff.com/sports/2017/9/20/1641497678_131504027204965649.aspx

College Sport Research Institute. (2014). Adjusted Graduation Gap Report: NCAA FBS Football. Retrieved from http://csriconference.org/home/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/2014-FOOTBALL-AGG-REPORT_10-7-14.pdf

Cooper, C. G., Weight, E. A., & Pierce, D. (2014). The leader-value continuum: NCAA Division I core values and transformational leadership. *The International Journal of Sport Management*, *15*, 1–21.

Cornwell, T. B., & Relyea, G. E. (2000). Understanding long-term effects of sports sponsorship: Role of experience, involvement, enthusiasm and clutter. *International Journal of Sports Marketing and Sponsorship*, *2*(2), 39–55. doi:10.1108/IJSMS-02-02-2000-B005

DeFreese, J. D., & Smith, A. L. (2013). Teammate social support, burnout, and self-determined motivation in collegiate athletes. *Psychology of Sport and Exercise*, *14*(2), 258–265. doi:10.1016/j.psychsport.2012.10.009

DeFreese, J. D., Weight, E. A., Kerr, Z., & Kroshus, E. (2019). Health and well-being outcomes of former NCAA student-athletes and non-athletes. *Journal of Issues in Intercollegiate Athletics*.

Desrochers, D. (2013). *Academic spending versus athletic spending: Who wins?* Washington, DC: American Institutes for Research

Division II Philosophy Statement. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.ncaa.org/governance/division-ii-philosophy-statement

Division III Philosophy Statement. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.ncaa.org/governance/division-iii-philosophy-statement

Fountain, J. J., & Finley, P. S. (2009). Academic majors of upperclassmen football players in the Atlantic Coast Conference: An analysis of academic clustering comparing white and minority players. *Journal of Issues in Intercollegiate Athletics*, *2*, 1–13.

Frey. (2012). Institutional control of athletics: An analysis of the role played by presidents, faculty, trustees, alumni, and the NCAA. In J. W. Swatterfield, R. L. Hughes, and K. Kearney (Eds.), *Sports and athletics in higher education*. Boston: MA: Pearson.

Fulks, D. (2017). Revenues and Expenses 2004 – 2016: NCAA Division I Report. Retrieved from https://www.ncaapublications.com

Fulks, D. L. (2015). Revenues and Expenses 2004 – 2014: NCAA Division II Intercollegiate Athletics Programs Report. Retrieved from http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Division%20II%20RE%20report.pdf

Fulks, D. L. (2016). Revenues and Expenses 2011 – 2015: NCAA Division III Intercollegiate Athletics Programs Report. Retrieved from http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D32015RevExp.pdf

Hawkins, B. (2013). *The new plantation: Black athletes, college sports, and predominantly white NCAA institutions*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hendrix, A. E., Acevedo, E. O., & Hebert, E. (2000). An examination of stress and burnout in certified athletic trainers at Division IA universities. *Journal of Athletic Training*, *35*(2), 139.

Hirko, S. (2009). Intercollegiate athletics and modeling multiculturalism. *New Directions for Higher Education*, *148*, 91–100. doi:10.1002/he.372

Howard-Hamilton, M. F., & Sina, J. A. (2001). How college affects student-athletes. *New Directions for Student Services*, *93*, 35–45. doi:10.1002/ss.3

International Events Group (IEG). (2017, December 18). "Year-End Recap: Sponsorship Spending on the Four Major U.S. Pro Sports Leagues." Sponsorship.com. Retrieved from http://www.sponsorship.com/Report/2017/12/18/Year-End-Recap–Sponsorship-Spending-On-The-Four-M.aspx

International Events Group (IEG) (2018, March 19). "Sponsorship Spending on College Athletics To Total $1.24 Billion In 2017/2018 Season." Retrieved from http://www.sponsorship.com/Report/2018/03/19/Sponsorship-Spending-On-College-Athletics-To-Total.aspx

Jensen, J. A., Walsh, P., Cobbs, J., & Turner, B. A. (2015). The effects of second screen use on sponsor brand awareness: A dual coding theory perspective. *Journal of Consumer Marketing*, *32*(2), 71–84. doi:10.1108/JCM-02-2014-0861

Jensen, J. A., Wakefield, L., Cobbs, J. B., & Turner, B. A. (2016). Forecasting sponsorship costs: Marketing intelligence in the athletic apparel industry. *Marketing Intelligence & Planning*, *34*(2), 281–298. doi:10.1108/MIP-09-2014-0179

Jensen, J. A., & Cornwell, T. B. (2017). Why do marketing relationships end? Findings from an integrated model of sport sponsorship decision-making. *Journal of Sport Management*, *31*(4), 401–418. doi:10.1123/jsm.2016-0232

Jensen, J. A., & Caneja, N. (2018). An empirical approach to analyzing sponsorships in intercollegiate athletics: The case of NCAA bowl sponsorships. *Journal of Issues in Intercollegiate Athletics*, *11*, 24–50.

Jensen, J. A., Walsh, P., & Cobbs, J. (2018). The moderating effect of identification on return on investment from sponsor brand integration. *International Journal of Sports Marketing and Sponsorship*, *19*(1), 41–57. doi:10.1108/IJSMS-10-2016-0077

Jensen, J. A., Spreyer, J., Lipsey, J., Popp, N., & Malekoff, R. (2019). Assessing demand for intercollegiate athletic departments: An investigation of multimedia rights agreements. *Journal of Global Sport Management*. doi:10.1080/24704067.2019.1577161

Jensen, J. A., & Cornwell, T. B. (in press). Assessing the dissolution of horizontal marketing relationships: The case of corporate sponsorship of sport. *Journal of Business Research*. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.10.029

Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics. (1991). Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete: A New Model for Intercollegiate Athletics.

Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics. (2001). A Call to Action. Retrieved from ttp://www.knightcommission.org/images/pdfs/2001_knight_report.pdf

Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics. (2009). Quantitative and qualitative research with football bowl subdivision university presidents on the costs and financing of intercollegiate athletics: Report of findings and implications. Retrieved from http://www.knightcommissionmedia.org/images/President_Survey_FINAL.pdf

Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics. (2010). Restoring the balance: Dollars, values, and the future of college sport. Retrieved from http://www.knightcommission.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=503&Itemid=166

Lanter, J. R., & Hawkins, B. J. (2013). The economic model of intercollegiate athletics and its effects on the college athlete educational experience. *Journal of Intercollegiate Sport*, *6*(1), 86–95.

Leeds, M. A., Von Allmen, P., & Matheson, V. A. (2018). The economics of sports. London: Routledge.

McCormick, R. A., & McCormick, A. C. (2006). The myth of the student-athlete: The college athlete as employee. *Washington Law Review*, *81*, 71–157.

Murdock, J. (2007). The new arms race. *Architectural Record*, *195*(11).

National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). (2010). Protecting the collegiate model. NCAA president briefing documents. Retrieved from http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/newmedia/2010/Emmert/Part5/protecting.html

National Collegiate Athletic Association Finances (2018). Retrieved from http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances

NCAA Division I Compliance Manual 2018–2019. (2018). Indianapolis: National Collegiate Athletic Association.

NCAA Division II Compliance Manual 2018–2019. (2018). Indianapolis: National Collegiate Athletic Association.

NCAA Division III Compliance Manual 2018–2019. (2018). Indianapolis: National Collegiate Athletic Association.

NCAA National Office (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/national-office

NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85. (1984).

Noll, R. G. (2013). *The antitrust economics of NCAA restrictions on athletic scholarships*. Raleigh, NC: Winthrop Intelligence.

Oriard, M. (2001). *King football: Sport & spectacle in the golden age of radio & newsreels, movies & magazines, the weekly & daily presses*. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.

Our Three Divisions. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-101/our-three-divisions

Pascarella, E. T., & Terenzini, P. T. (2005). *How college affects students: A third decade of research*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Pockrass, B. (2017, March 8). "How NASCAR teams are dealing with unfilled sponsorships in 2017." ESPN.com. Retrieved from http://www.espn.com/racing/nascar/story/_/id/18856556/nascar-how-teams-drivers-deal-unfilled-sponsorships-2017

Popp, N., Jensen, J., & Jackson, R. (2017). Maximizing visitors at college football bowl games. *International Journal of Event and Festival Management*, *8*(3), 261–273. doi:10.1108/IJEFM-02-2017-0014

Potuto, J. R., & O'Hanlon, J. (2007). National study of student-athletes regarding their experiences as college students. *College Student Journal*, *41*(4), 1–87.

Rosewater, A. (2009). Learning to play and playing to learn: Organized sports and educational outcome. *The Education Digest*, *75*(1), 50.

Sack, A. L., & Staurowsky, E. J. (1998). *College athletes for hire: The evolution and legacy of the NCAA's amateur myth*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.

Sanderson, A. R., & Siegfried, J. J. (2015). The case for paying college athletes. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, *29*(1), 115–138. doi:10.1257/jep.29.1.115

Savage, H. J., Bentley, H. W., McGovern, J. T., & Smiley, D. F. (1929). *American College Athletics. Bulletin number twenty three*. New York, NY: The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Retrieved from http://archive.carnegiefoundation.org/pdfs/elibrary/American_College_Athletics.pdf

Séguin, B., & O'Reilly, N. J. (2008). The Olympic brand, ambush marketing and clutter. *International Journal of Sport Management and Marketing*, *4*(1), 62–84.

Shulman, J. L., & Bowen, W. G. (2011). *The game of life: College sports and educational values* (Vol. 62). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Shropshire, K. L., & Williams, C. D. Jr, (2017). *The miseducation of the student athlete: How to fix college sports*. Philadelphia, PA: Wharton Digital Press.

Smith, R. K. (2000). A brief history of the National Collegiate Athletic Association's role in regulating intercollegiate athletics. *Marquette Sports Law Review*, *11*(9).

Smith, J. M., & Willingham, M. (2015). *Cheated: The UNC scandal, the education of athletes, and the future of big-time college sports*. Dulles, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Smith, R. (2011). *Pay for play: A history of big-time college athletic reform*. Urbana, Chicago, and Springfield, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Southall, R. M., & Staurowsky, E. J. (2013). Cheering on the collegiate model: Creating, disseminating, and imbedding the NCAA's redefinition of amateurism. *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, *37*(4), 403–429. doi:10.1177/0193723513498606

Thelin, J. (1996). Games colleges play: Scandal and reform in intercollegiate athletics. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

University Learning Outcomes Assessment. (2011). Intercollegiate athletes report of means. Retrieved from http://www.measuringbehaviors.com/AthletesFinal2011.pdf

Vealey, R. S., Armstrong, L., Comar, W., & Greenleaf, C. A. (1998). Influence of perceived coaching behaviors on burnout and competitive anxiety in female college athletes. *Journal of Applied Sport Psychology*, *10*(2), 297–318. doi:10.1080/10413209808406395

Weathersby, J. (2016, July, 6). Teddy Roosevelt's Role in the Creation of the NCAA. The Sports Historian. Retrieved from https://www.thesportshistorian.com/teddy-roosevelts-role-in-the-creation-of-the-ncaa/#

Weight, E. A., Bonfiglio, A., DeFreese, J. D., Kerr, Z., & Osborne, B. (2018). Occupational measures of former NCAA athletes and traditional students. *The International Journal of Sport Management*, *19*(2), 1–26.

Weight, E. A., Cooper, C., & Popp, N. K. (2015). The coach-educator: NCAA Division I coach perspectives about an integrated university organisational structure. *Journal of Sport Management*, *29*(5), 510–522. doi:10.1123/jsm.2014-0006

Weight, E. A., Navarro, K., Huffman, L., & Smith-Ryan, A. (2014). Quantifying the psychological benefits of intercollegiate athletics participation: Implications for higher education policy and practice. *Journal of Issues in Intercollegiate Athletics*, *7*, 390–409.

Weight, E. A., Weight, M. A., & Schneider, R. (2013). Confronting the arms race: Conference commissioner perspectives on spending within intercollegiate athletics. *International Journal of Sport Management*, *14*, 1–21.

What is the NCAA? (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-101/what-ncaa

Where does the money go? (2018). Retrieved from http://www.ncaa.org/about/where-does-money-go

Wiles, M. A., & Danielova, A. (2009). The worth of product placement in successful films: An event study analysis. *Journal of Marketing*, *73*(4), 44–63. doi:10.1509/jmkg.73.4.044

Zimbalist, A. (1999). *Unpaid professionals: Commercialism and conflict in big-time college sports*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.